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Abstract: This paper examines whether monetary shocks can consistently generate stagflation in 
a dynamic, stochastic setting. I assume that the monetary authority can induce transitory shocks 
and longer-lasting monetary regime changes in its operating instrument. Firms cannot distinguish 
between these shocks and must learn about them using a signal extraction problem. The 
possibility of changes in the monetary regime greatly improves the ability of money to generate 
stagflation. This is true whether the regime actually changes or not. If the monetary regime 
changes on average once every ten years, stagflation occurs in 76% of model simulations. The 
intuition for this result is simple: increased output volatility due to learning coupled with 
inflation inertia produce conditions conducive to the emergence of stagflation. The incidence of 
stagflation can be reduced by a stable, transparent central bank. 
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I Introduction 
 
Stagflation has not occurred in the U.S. in more than twenty years.  This does not mean, 
however, that it has disappeared from the minds of policymakers or the popular press.  Spikes in 
oil prices continually renew interest in the topic due to the conventional view that oil prices were 
a central factor in the 1970s’ stagflation. 
Yet multiple oil price fluctuations in the last twenty years have not been followed by 
stagflation, suggesting that such a connection is tenuous or dependent upon other factors.  This 
paper questions the extent to which oil shocks—or, more broadly, any supply shocks—are 
necessary to generate stagflation.  In short, I find that they are not necessary.  I present evidence 
that a dynamic, stochastic model with monetary shocks can consistently generate stagflation 
similar to the U.S. experience of the 1970s. 
The key stagflation-generating mechanism is the possibility that the monetary authority 
may implement two types of changes to its operating instrument which are not immediately 
distinguishable to price-setters in the economy.  In this paper, the monetary authority can 
exogenously induce transitory as well as long-lasting changes in the money growth rate.  The 
latter are monetary regime changes; they occur stochastically and can take on a continuum of 
values.  While the monetary authority has perfect knowledge regarding the monetary regime, I 
assume that firms do not, requiring them to learn about the regime via a signal extraction 
problem.  I show the consequences of such learning in an environment characterized by nominal 
rigidities which prevent firms from continuously updating their information. 
Using U.S. historical data as a guide, I propose an algorithm to identify stagflation in 
quarterly data.  The algorithm requires a particular quarter to satisfy three conditions in order to 
be classified as “stagflationary”: (1) inflation must be at least one standard deviation above its 
long-run average; (2) output must be below trend and have worsened relative to trend since the 
previous quarter; and (3) either the preceding or succeeding quarter must also satisfy (1) and (2) 
as well.  Applying this algorithm to the simulated model, I find that stagflation is very rare when 
regime changes are not possible, occurring in only 6% of simulations. 
Adding the possibility of changes in the monetary regime dramatically alters these 
results.  For instance, suppose that the monetary regime changes once every ten years on 
average.  When this is the case, the simultaneous incidence of high inflation and below-trend 3 
output which characterize stagflation occurs at least once in 76% of simulations.  Moreover, the 
monetary regime need not change to produce similar results: firms’ uncertainty associated with 
the fact that the monetary regime can change is enough to generate stagflation.  The intuition for 
this result is simple: the learning process required when transitory shocks and regime changes are 
indistinguishable induces volatility in the output gap which, when combined with inflationary 
inertia, produces conditions conducive to the appearance of stagflation.  This is true even for 
relatively rare regime changes—i.e., on the order of once every thirty years. 
Removing price-setters’ learning reduces the incidence of monetary stagflation.  When 
the central bank’s actions are transparent and price-setters can distinguish between transitory 
shocks and regime changes, stagflation occurs less frequently in the simulations.  Most of the 
remaining stagflation is related to changes in the monetary regime.  This suggests that stable 
monetary authorities (i.e., those which do not undergo regime changes) with transparent policies 
can reduce the likelihood of monetary stagflation.  Alternatively, if the central bank were to 
announce regime changes prior to implementing them, it is possible the remaining stagflationary 
episodes would be eliminated. 
This paper contributes to a literature that stresses potential connections between money 
and stagflation.  In two recent works, Barsky and Kilian (2002) and Orphanides and Williams 
(2005a) present models that combine elements of regime changes and learning, and they show 
that stagflation can arise in response to particular sets of shocks.  This paper makes regime 
changes a stochastic component of the economy and shows that stagflation from monetary 
shocks arises regularly within a dynamic setting.  Restrictive assumptions on the timing of the 
regime change or the sequence of shocks are not required, nor is a regime change per se 
necessary for an economy to experience stagflation.  The particular form of monetary regime 
changes, while similar to that employed by Andolfatto and Gomme (2003), allows for a wider 
range of possible outcomes. 
The outline of this paper is as follows.  Section II examines the U.S. economic history of 
the 1970s and early 1980s to construct an algorithm for finding stagflation in quarterly data.  
Section III develops the sticky information model used in the analysis, introduces the monetary 
authority, and explains how firms learn about the monetary regime.  I simulate the model and 
interpret the results in Section IV.  I also consider how the results would be altered if certain 
assumptions in the original setup were altered.  Section V concludes. 4 
 
II  Stagflation and the U.S. Experience  
 
Most commonly, stagflation is thought of as the unfortunate coincidence of falling output and 
fast-rising prices.  In a static AS-AD model, such a result must be due to a leftward shift of the 
aggregate supply curve.  Combining these facts, introductory and intermediate students of 
macroeconomics quickly conclude that stagflation in the 1970s and early 1980s had to be caused 
by supply shocks, thereby typically implicating oil. 
This simplification brings up several points.  First, stagflation is not as well-defined, 
either in theory or in the data, as these students might believe.  Second, the price of oil has 
surged several times since the 1970s without the stagflationary episodes this analysis appears to 
ensure.
1  Finally, many more shocks buffeted the economy in the 1970s than oil shocks; see, e.g., 
Blinder (1979), Bruno and Sachs (1985), Helliwell (1988), and Barsky and Kilian (2002).  Each 
of these studies assigns to monetary policy a varying degree of responsibility in causing the 
stagflationary experiences of the 1970s and early 1980s, yet the former three stress the inclusion 
of some type of causal role emanating from the supply side of the economy.  To determine 
whether monetary shocks in the context of a model can generate stagflation, I first examine the 
U.S. experience to establish exactly what “stagflation” means. 
 
The Data for this Study 
 
The data for this study were collected from the St. Louis Fed’s Federal Reserve 
Economic Database (FRED).  Stagflation is analyzed using data on real GDP and the GDP 
deflator.  Real GDP is in billions of chained 1996 dollars, seasonally adjusted at annual rates.  
The corresponding series for the GDP deflator is the seasonally adjusted chain-type price index 
with base year 1996.  Both series are from the BEA.  I also use data from the Federal Reserve 
Board of Governors on seasonally adjusted M2 as the measure of the money stock.  All series 
run from 1959:1 to 2002:4.  To compare the stagflation findings using output with those using 
                                                 
1 The connection between oil and recession (e.g., Hamilton 2003) is distinct from the connection between oil and 
stagflation in the 1970s that dominates conventional wisdom. 5 
unemployment, I examine the evolution of the monthly civilian unemployment rate in the U.S. 
based on seasonally adjusted data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
 
Stagflation in the United States  
 
One problem in identifying stagflation is that, unlike Cagan’s (1956) classic definition of 
hyperinflation, there is not a similar consensus regarding the exact definition of stagflation.  This 
should come as little surprise: semantically, the terms “stagnation” and “inflation” have a variety 
of interpretations, as would their contraction.   In some ways, stagflation is the classic “I’ll-
know-it-when-I-see-it”: most agree that the U.S. experienced stagflation in the 1970s and early 
1980s, but nearly nobody defines exactly what it was that made the experience stagflationary nor 
provides precise beginning and ending dates.  For instance, Blinder’s (1979) first sentence reads, 
“Stagflation is a term coined by our abbreviation-happy society to connote the simultaneous 
occurrence of economic stagnation and comparatively high rates of inflation.”  Similarly, Bruno 
and Sachs (1985) in their introduction state, “The period of ‘stagflation’ (stagnation combined 
with inflation) broke out with a vengeance during 1973–75.”  Neither returns to give a more 
rigorous definition.  Iain Macleod, who is recognized as the creator of the term, defined it as “not 
just inflation on the one side or stagnation on the other, but both of them together.”
2 
The data yield important clues in defining stagflation.  The historical record for the U.S. 
for output and GDP deflator inflation from 1970 to 1983 is displayed in Figure 1.  The annual 
data are striking.  First, real GDP growth was negative for four years during this time: 1970, 
1974, 1980, and 1982.  (Part or all of these years were NBER-defined recessions.)  The largest 
contraction came in 1974, when real GDP fell by 2.2%.  There were also three years—1972, 
1978, and 1983—of rapid GDP growth exceeding 6%.  Second, there were two inflationary 
peaks: in 1974 at 10.2%, and in 1980 at 9.4%.  Both coincided with negative real GDP growth.  
Thus it seems logical that 1974 and 1980 were stagflationary years: the economy was not only 
stagnant but was contracting, and inflation was not only very high but had also accelerated from 
the previous year in each case. 
Less clear are the years immediately preceding and following 1974 and 1980.  Relative to 
the peak years of 1972 and 1978, output growth was markedly lower in 1973 and 1979, at 3.9% 
                                                 
2 As cited in Nelson and Nikolov (2004). 6 
and 1.4%, respectively, while inflation in both years was high (above 6.5%) and accelerating.  
Depending on the extent to which the economy must be “stagnant”—or, in a dynamic sense, 
“stagnating”—these years may be construed as stagflationary as well.  Meanwhile, inflation in 
1975 and 1981 had fallen from its peak in the previous year but was still high at 7.2% and 8.0%, 
respectively.  Output growth in 1975 had rebounded to 2.6% and was trending up, whereas in 
1981 output growth was 1.2% before plummeting the following year. 
While I rely on output and deflator inflation data for comparison with the model 
economies, examining the unemployment rate confirms the severity of the situation in the labor 
market in 1974 and 1980.  As Figure 2 shows, unemployment surged from 5.1% in January, 
1974, to 8.1% in January, 1975, before peaking in May.  There was a similar but less severe 
increase in 1980, when unemployment rose from 6.3% in January to 7.7% in July before falling 
off slightly.  The spikes in unemployment in 1974 and 1980 reinforce the idea that these were 
stagflationary years by nearly any definition.  However, they do little to answer the question of 
whether the preceding and following years should also be classified as stagflationary. 
To assist in identifying exact stagflationary dates, Figure 3 displays quarterly data for the 
period.  To avoid volatility in quarterly real GDP growth, the measure of economic activity is the 
output gap based upon the Hodrick-Prescott (1997) filter.  This measure of the output gap was 
negative on four occasions, ignoring the singular quarter in 1978: 1970:1–1972:1, 1974:3–
1977:2, 1980:2–1980:3, and 1981:4–1983:4.  (Once again, all four periods at least partially 
coincide with NBER-defined recessions.)  Substantial peaks occurred in 1973:2 and 1978:4.  
Quarterly inflation, meanwhile, was high throughout most of the period.  Over the longer period 
1959:1–2002:4, the average quarterly inflation rate was 3.7% (at an annual rate).  Compared with 
this long-run average, inflation was above average continuously between 1972:3 and 1982:4.  If 
we define “high inflation” as an inflation rate more than one standard deviation above its long-
run average—in this case, above 6.2%—then the U.S. experienced high inflation between 1973:2 
and 1975:1, briefly again in 1975 and 1977, and between 1977:4 and 1981:4.  Inflation also 
reached two local maxima: 12% in 1974:3 and 10.6% in 1980:4.  The peak in 1974 coincides 
with a negative output gap for the third quarter but the second peak does not, as the output gap 
was positive and rising. 
I mention the periods of above-average, high, and accelerating inflation because of the 
controversy that surrounds the definition of stagflation and the dilemma in the data; see Barsky 7 
and Kilian (2002) and Blanchard (2002).  If stagflation requires that the economy be stagnant—
defined as an output gap that is negative—coupled with high inflation, then we have such an 
experience from mid-1974 into 1975, late 1976 into 1977, and again in 1980.
3  But if inflation 
must be high and accelerating from one quarter to the next while output is below the natural rate, 
we are left with fewer choices: 1974:3, 1975:3, 1976:4, and 1980:2.  The annual data downplay 
the potentially stagflationary episodes in 1976 and 1977: from Figure 1, real GDP growth was 
4.5% in 1976 and inflation was at a local minimum of 5.2%, while real GDP growth was even 
higher at 4.9% in 1977.  Thus after examining both the annual and quarterly data we are left with 
two viable stagflation candidates: 1974–75 and 1980. 
 
A Stagflation Algorithm 
 
Using the above analysis as a guide, I propose an algorithm for identifying stagflation in 
quarterly data.  This algorithm is applied to the model economy simulations in the next sections.  
If a particular quarter satisfies the following three criteria, I label it “stagflationary.”  A 
“stagflationary episode” is then a sequence of consecutive stagflationary quarters. 
(1) Inflation must be relatively high.  Inflation is “high” in a particular quarter if it is at 
least one standard deviation above its long-run average.  For the purposes of this paper, the long-
run is considered to be a 176-quarter period, matching the 1959–2002 time span. 
(2) The economy must be “stagnant.”  This is satisfied if the output gap for the quarter is 
negative and the output gap has decreased since the previous quarter.  Thus output is below trend 
and worsening relative to trend. 
(3) A stagflationary episode must last longer than one quarter.  Either the preceding 
quarter or the quarter that follows must also satisfy (1) and (2) in order for a given quarter to be 
considered stagflationary.  This prevents a temporary negative blip from being counted as a 
stagflationary episode and is in the spirit of the negative connotation of the term. 
                                                 
3 This rules out the possibility illustrated in Blinder (1979, 2002) whereby an aggregate demand shock that causes 
output to overshoot the natural rate results in a stagflationary period as output returns to normal.  This is consistent 
with Blanchard’s (2002) comment that unemployment must be high—i.e., above the natural rate—during a 
stagflation and with the conventional wisdom that the virulence of a stagflationary experience caused by an 
aggregate supply shock, in the most basic introductory sense, comes from an output gap that is negative in 
conjunction with inflation. 8 
Applying this algorithm to the U.S. data from 1959 through 2002 yields five quarters—
1974:3, 1974:4, 1975:1, 1980:2, and 1980:3—that are classified as stagflationary.  These 
observations match the graphical examination of the historical record and can be seen in the 
context of the period 1959–2002 in Figure 4.
4 
 
III   Sticky Information and Monetary Regime Changes 
 
The analysis of monetary explanations of stagflation utilizes the sticky information model of 
Mankiw and Reis (2002) but modifies this model to allow for the possibility of regime changes 
as suggested by Barsky and Killian (2002).  Specifically, I assume that the monetary authority 
can induce transitory and potentially long-lasting changes in its operating instrument, where 
long-term changes represent monetary regime changes.  These regime changes come at random 
intervals and can take on a continuum of sizes.  Price-setters, unable to distinguish between the 
transitory shocks and the regime changes, must filter the available information in order to make 
forecasts for use in price-setting.  This modification introduces a new set of dynamics to the 
literature on models of sticky information. 
 
A Sticky Information Model 
 
The key assumption underlying the sticky information model is that information 
acquisition is costly and because of this price-setters have incentives to update their information 
infrequently.  This contrasts with sticky price models, which assume that price adjustment is 
costly, thus giving firms incentives to change prices infrequently.
5  While Calvo (1983)-style 
updating makes the models equally tractable, the sticky information model does not share the 
disinflationary booms or the lack of inflation inertia that arise from the standard New Keynesian 
Phillips curve in the absence of ad hoc assumptions on pricing (see, e.g., Ball 1994, Nelson 1998, 
                                                 
4 One may wish to consider a broader definition of stagflation, so that more of the 1970s are considered to be 
stagflationary.  The criteria set out seek to capture the “heart” of what constitutes stagflation. 
5 In a case study of a large industrial manufacturer, Zbaracki et al. (2004) find that managerial costs—including 
information acquisition, decision-making, and communication—are almost an order of magnitude larger than 
explicit menu costs of changing prices.  Carroll (2003), Mankiw and Reis (2003), Mankiw et al. (2004), Andrés et 
al. (2005), Kiley (2005), and Khan and Zhu (2006) present empirical evidence of sticky information. 9 
and Mankiw and Reis 2002).
6  In addition, Andrés et al. (2005) show that the sticky information 
model satisfies the Natural Rate Hypothesis for a broader set of conditions than models that rely 
on sticky prices and Calvo price-setting. 
The sticky information model consists of identical, monopolistically competitive firms.  
A firm’s desired price at time t, 
*
t p , is 
 
*
tt t p py α =+ , (3.1) 
where pt is the aggregate price level and yt is the output gap.  (All variables are in natural logs, 
and firm-specific subscripts are omitted since firms are identical.)  Normalizing the (log) natural 
rate of output to zero, the latter term is also output. 
Because it is costly to acquire new information, firms do so infrequently.  For tractability, 
the model assumes that each period a fraction λ of firms update their information.  This 
probability is independent of a firm’s information-updating history. 
The model has three key equations.  First, unlike typical sticky price models, all firms are 
able to set a different price at time t from the price they set at time  1 t − .  However, the fraction 
1 λ −  do so using their old information about the currently optimal price.  The expectation that is 
relevant for the firms using old information is the time ti −  expectation of the time t optimal 
price: a firm that last updated its information i>0 periods ago sets the time t price  ( )
*
, ˆti t i t p Ep − = , 
where 
*
t p  is the firm’s desired price from (3.1).
7  The fraction λ of firms that update their 
information at time t set 
*
,0 ˆtt p p = .  Second, the aggregate price level is the average of all 










=− ∑  
Third, combining these two equations with the equation for a firm’s desired price (3.1) yields the 
sticky information Phillips curve 














=+ − + Δ
− ∑ , (3.2) 
where  t y Δ  is output growth or, alternatively, the change in the output gap. 
                                                 
6 Trabandt (2003), Keen (2005), and Coibion (2006) show the sensitivity of inflation inertia in the sticky information 
model to real rigidities and a DSGE setting.  
7 This is similar in spirit to expected market-clearing price models, but now only a fraction of agents use a particular 
set of expectations.  This helps remedy the deficiencies of these models as identified in Nelson (1998).  10 
For simplicity, aggregate demand takes a quantity theoretic form 
  tt t mpy = + . (3.3) 
With constant log velocity normalized to zero, mt can be interpreted as money.  
 
Modeling the Monetary Authority 
 
  The monetary authority controls the money supply through the money growth equation  
  1 tt tt mM m ρ ε − Δ =+ Δ+ . (3.4) 
Transitory changes to its operating instrument, which are persistent by virtue of the parameter 
(0,1) ρ ∈ , are denoted by εt.  These are modeled as i.i.d., normally distributed shocks with mean 
zero and variance 
2
ε σ .  The term Mt is the monetary regime as of time t, since 
1 (1 ) t M ρ
− −  
represents the monetary authority’s “long-run” money growth target at that time.  I allow for the 
possibility that the central bank may change the “long-run” target by specifying 
  1 tM t t MM ρ ξ − = + . (3.5) 
Changes in Mt are thus monetary regime changes.
8  I assume that regime changes are potentially 
long-lasting—and therefore distinguishable from transitory shocks—by considering  ( ,1] M ρ ρ ∈ .  
On average, one would assume that a regime change may be a rare occurrence, and when 
a regime change does occur it is of uncertain size.  Thus I model the shock ξt as consisting of two 
parts, ξt=ζt*γt.  The random variable ζt determines whether a regime change occurs or not.  This 
can be modeled as a Poisson process with mean and variance β.  The size of the regime change is 
determined by γt, which is normally distributed with mean zero and variance 
2
γ σ .  Both variables 
are identically distributed and independent—of each other and of the transitory shocks. 
All firms know the structural parameters ρ, ρM, β, 
2
ε σ , and 
2
γ σ .  The money growth rate 
Δmt along with its entire history is observable by all firms who update their information at time t 
                                                 
8 This is related to the suggestion in Barsky and Kilian (2002) that the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system of 
fixed exchange rates constituted a monetary regime change, which ushered in a period of more expansionary 
monetary policy and played a central role in the U.S. stagflation of the 1970s.  Andolfatto and Gomme (2003) 
present a similar model of monetary regime changes which relies upon a two-state Markov process.  In that case, 
regime changes could still be a rare occurrence, but they would not be of uncertain size.  De facto, long-run changes 
in money growth equate to long-run changes in inflation (and, implicitly, the monetary authority’s target for it).  
Allowing for shifts in monetary policymakers’ long-run inflation objectives is consistent with U.S. evidence 
presented by Kozicki and Tinsley (2001a, 2001b). 11 
or later.  In the majority of the analysis, however, I assume that only the monetary authority 
knows the monetary regime Mt with certainty.  If β=0, then all firms know the monetary 
regime—and, for that matter, that the regime will never change.  In this case, firms that see 
shocks know with certainty that they are transitory.  When β>0, firms observe the difference 
between Δmt and  1 t m ρ − Δ , 
  1 tt t t t mm x M ρ ε − Δ− Δ == +, (3.6) 
but they are unable to distinguish between individual elements of xt. 
 
Learning by Firms 
 
Forecasting future money growth is important for price-setters since a firm that last 
updated its information i>0 periods ago sets its price today to  , ˆ (1 ) ti t i t t i t p Ep Em α α −− = −+ .  
Because of this, knowing the monetary regime is crucial.  When the central bank’s actions are 
not completely transparent, firms must learn about the nature of the monetary regime. 
Given (3.4), (3.5), and the structure of the shocks, firms use a signal extraction problem 
to form projections over the paths of future variables.  I adapt this to the firms’ problem in the 










Δ= ∑ , (3.7) 









=∑ . (3.8) 
With (3.7), (3.8), and (3.3), one is able to calculate impulse responses for inflation and the output 
gap and simulate the model. 
 
Calibration and Impulse Responses for Transitory Shocks and Regime Changes 
 
To illustrate the interaction between learning and the sticky information model with 
transitory shocks and regime changes, Figure 5 through Figure 8 present impulse responses to 
the two shocks.  Prior to time t=0, the economy is in a steady state with zero money growth 12 
( 1 0 M− = ).  The parameters are calibrated as follows.  To ensure stationarity and make regime 
changes long-lasting but not permanent per se, I calibrate ρM to 0.999.  I initially allow the 
probability of a shock to the monetary regime, where β is the mean of the Poisson process 
governing regime change arrivals, to take on one of two values: β=0 (no regime changes are 
possible) and β=0.025 (a regime change occurs approximately once every ten years).
9  The rate 
of firm information updating (λ) is set to 0.25, so that firms update their information once per 
year on average (see, e.g., Khan and Zhu 2006).  The measure of real rigidity, in the spirit of Ball 
and Romer (1990), is set so α=0.1, as in Mankiw and Reis (2002). 
The remaining parameters relate to the persistence and variability of the money growth 
process.  The AR coefficient in the money growth equation, ρ, is 0.56.  The standard deviation of 
the transitory shocks, σε, is 0.006.  With a quarterly model, a one standard deviation transitory 
shock increases money growth by 2.4 percentage-points on an annual basis in the quarter in 
which it occurs.  The standard deviation of the size of the regime-change shocks, σγ, is 0.003.  
Thus a one standard deviation regime change causes money growth to rise 1.2 percentage-points 
in the quarter in which it occurs.  Given the values of ρ and ρM, money growth subsequently 
accelerates further for several quarters, peaking at slightly above 2.75 percentage-points before 
beginning a very slow descent (due to the extreme persistence of ρM).
10 
Figure 5 depicts the case in which no regime changes are possible (β=0) and money 
growth increases by one standard deviation at time t=0.  This is a “known” transitory change in 
money growth that will persist for a short time.  (Alternatively, this also describes the case in 
which β>0 but firms can distinguish between transitory shocks and regime changes.)  As in 
Mankiw and Reis (2002), the sticky information model exhibits inflation inertia: inflation 
follows a hump shape and peaks seven quarters after the monetary expansion.  The output gap 
also follows a hump-shaped pattern, peaking three quarters after the shock. 
                                                 
9 This paper considers exogenous changes to the monetary regime.  An example of such an exogenous shock might 
be a change in the Federal Reserve Chairmanship to a chairman who has a different target money growth rate than 
his predecessor.  During the period 1959–2002, there were five different chairmen for an average tenure of about 
nine years.  Using Canadian data, Andolfatto and Gomme (2003) estimate that average regimes similar to those 
above last ten years.  In subsequent sections, I consider other values for this parameter as well. 
10 Given the calibrations ρM=0.999 and β=0.025, the values for ρ, σε, and σγ were estimated via simulated method of 
moments based upon the empirical standard deviation and autocorrelations of M2 money growth in U.S. data from 
1959 through 2002.  While changes in β (below) would produce different estimates, these parameters were kept for 
the sake of comparison with this baseline set of parameters. 13 
Allowing for the possibility that the monetary regime might change has dramatic effects, 
even if the economy experiences the same transitory shock as above.  In Figures 6 and 7, the 
probability that the monetary regime changes in a given quarter is β=0.025.  More important, 
however, is the fact that now agents cannot immediately distinguish between transitory shocks to 
the money growth rate and regime changes, and they must learn about the nature of the shock.  
These are “unknown” shocks, in contrast with the “known” transitory shock from Figure 5. 
In Figure 6, money growth experiences a transitory positive one standard deviation shock 
that is unknown to agents.  This shock is the same size as that in Figure 5.  Initially, the 
responses of inflation and the output gap in the model appear similar to those when the shock is 
known to be transitory: the output gap peaks three quarters after the shock, and the inflation rate 
increases gradually and peaks later (after eight quarters in this case).  However, shortly thereafter 
the responses diverge and the output gap exhibits oscillatory behavior—so that the output gap 
turns negative twelve quarters after the monetary expansion.
11 
Explaining this phenomenon is relatively simple.  Recall that the transitory expansionary 
shocks to money growth are identical in Figures 5 and 6.  The responses of inflation, however, 
are different.  Inflation rises by a maximum of 0.44 percentage-point after seven quarters when 
the shock is known to be transitory but 0.61 percentage-point after eight quarters when the 
duration of the shock is not known.  In effect, firms in the unknown-shock case “hedge their 
bets” regarding the type of shock they have experienced.  In a sticky information environment, 
firms that update their information following the shock place a positive probability on the fact 
that Mt changed, which in turn affects their expectations over future optimal prices until they 
next update their information.  It is only over time—as more price-setters update their 
information and have more observations with which to form forecasts—that agents begin to 
learn that it was most likely a transitory shock.  The result is that inflation overshoots where it 
should have been, leading to inflation that is relatively high compared with the case in which the 
shock is known to be transitory.  For the same rate of money growth, a rate of inflation that is too 
high implies that output growth, and therefore the output gap, must be too low.  Thus we see the 
oscillatory behavior of the output gap. 
Figure 7 presents the behavior of inflation and the output gap in response to a one 
standard deviation increase in the monetary regime Mt at time t=0.  Because of the AR term in 
                                                 
11 This is not due to money growth, which is above its steady-state level and is converging monotonically toward it. 14 
(3.4), money growth initially jumps and then accelerates further for several quarters, peaking at 
slightly less than 2.75% before beginning a very slow descent (due to the extreme persistence of 
ρM).  There is no announcement or clarification on the part of the monetary authority, so firms do 
not know if this is a transitory shock or a regime change.  For comparison, Figure 8 depicts the 
responses to the same shock when the actions of the central bank are transparent and firms 
realize that the monetary regime has changed. 
The increase in Mt leads to an expansion which is much longer in the case of an unknown 
shock than in the case of a known shock.  Again, the intuition behind this result is clear.  It is 
only with time that firms learn about the duration of the shock.  Following the regime change, 
firms which acquire new information believe with some positive probability that money growth 
simply experienced a transitory shock.  The prices these firms set will therefore be lower than 
they would have been if information about the monetary regime were known with certainty.  As 
a result, inflation does not rise as quickly as it should and a long expansion ensues. 
A close examination of the impulse responses reveals why the combination of the sticky 
information model and indistinguishable transitory shocks and long-lasting regime changes can 
yield stagflation.  From Figure 6, inflation’s overshooting causes the output gap to be falling—
and turn negative—while (inertial) inflation is still high.  As set out in the previous section, this 
is classic stagflation.  In addition, from Figure 7 we see that a regime change under learning 
leads to a longer expansion and a slower inflation response than the case in which the regime 
change is known.  In a stochastic environment, it is thus conceivable that a contractionary 
(unknown) regime change, starting from a point in which inflation was already above average, 
might produce stagflation more often than if the regime change were known with certainty. 
 
IV  Stagflation in the Simulations 
 
I simulate the model from Section III and apply the stagflation algorithm to the simulated data to 
determine whether the model can consistently generate stagflation similar to the U.S. experience.  
When only transitory shocks to money growth are possible, the model is incapable of producing 
stagflation on a consistent basis.  When monetary regime changes are possible, the model 
economy regularly experiences at least one stagflationary episode.  I show that this result is not 15 
dependent upon actual changes to the monetary regime: the uncertainty surrounding monetary 




Since the data used to construct the stagflation algorithm considered the period 1959–
2002, the model is simulated for 176 quarters to match this time frame.  To ensure that the results 
are not dependent upon initial starting values, the model is simulated for 100 preliminary 
quarters prior to the 176 of interest.  Before that time, the economy was in its steady state.  All 
calibrations are the same as those used in Section III, and the results are based upon 1,000 
simulations.  While the parameter governing the arrival of regime changes, β, is varied, the same 
sets of transitory money growth shocks (ε) and regime change sizes (γ) are used between sets of 
simulations to limit the effect of different shock realizations. 
Table 1 presents simulation results.  Consider first the case in which monetary regime 
changes are not possible (β=0) and firms know this fact.  The results are clear: stagflation is very 
rare, with only 6% of simulations suffering at least one stagflationary episode.  Choosing a larger 
standard deviation for the exogenous transitory money shocks would better fit the data in terms 
of the standard deviation of money growth (0.88% in the U.S. data; 0.7% on average in the 
simulations), but this does not produce more stagflation.  Furthermore, while it would increase 
the standard deviation of inflation (0.62% in the data; 0.31% on average in the simulations), it 
would also increase the volatility of the output gap which is already higher than in the empirical 
data (1.55% in the data; 2.48% in the simulations). 
Alternatively, consider the baseline case in which β=0.025, so that on average the 
monetary regime changes once every ten years.  The central bank does not make its policies (in 
the form of money growth shocks) explicitly known, which requires that firms learn about the 
nature of the shocks they face through a signal extraction problem.  This combination of factors 
generates stagflation regularly: 76% of the simulations experience at least one stagflationary 
episode.  On average, 3.6 out of the 176 quarters of each simulation fit the stagflationary criteria.  
If one only considers the 76% of simulations with stagflation, the average number of 
stagflationary quarters is 4.7.  This is very similar to the five stagflationary quarters in the U.S. 
data during the period 1959–2002.  Additionally, the inclusion of monetary regime changes 16 
makes the within-sample standard deviations of money growth and inflation similar to those 
from the data. 
To rule out the possibility that there is something inherently special about this particular 
β, the Poisson probability governing the arrival of monetary regime changes, I consider other 
values for this parameter as well.  Table 1 presents results for a range of βs such that, at one end 
of the spectrum, a monetary regime change occurs on average once every 50 years, to the  
extreme possibility that the regime changes on average once per year.  The basic result still 
holds: even the remote possibility of a monetary regime change is enough to consistently 
generate stagflation.  If the monetary regime changes more frequently, on average, than once 
every 35 years, there is greater than a 50% probability that stagflation will occur within a given 
176-quarter period.  Moreover, as regime changes become more likely within a given quarter—
i.e., as β increases—the incidence of stagflation increases as well. 
 
The Role of Regime Changes  
 
The positive correlation between the probability of a regime change, β, and the incidence 
of stagflation suggests two possibilities.  First, as β increases, the monetary regime changes more 
frequently, and it is these regime changes which cause more stagflationary episodes.  
Alternatively, as β increases, price-setters experience more uncertainty—since a given shock has 
a greater probability of being a regime change than before—and it is this additional uncertainty 
which produces more stagflationary episodes.  This section supports the latter by showing that 
regime changes need not occur in order to generate stagflation.  The uncertainty caused by the 
mere possibility of a monetary regime change, and the subsequent learning via a signal 
extraction problem, are enough to regularly cause the phenomenon. 
To assess the role regime changes play, I divide the 1,000 simulations into two groups 
based upon whether a monetary regime change occurred within the 176 quarters of interest or 
not.  These groups are labeled “One regime” and “Multiple regimes,” and Table 2 presents the 
results from this dichotomization.  For most probabilities of a regime change, stagflation is only 
slightly more likely to occur when the monetary regime changes than when it does not.  For the 
case in which a monetary regime change occurs on average once every ten years, the incidence 17 
of stagflation is virtually the same.
12  While regime changes produce conditions favorable to 
slightly longer stagflationary episodes, this is suggestive evidence that it is learning about the 
nature of the monetary shocks—and not monetary regime changes per se—that is responsible for 
consistently generating stagflation in this model. 
This result is related to two recent studies of stagflation.
13  In one, Barsky and Kilian 
(2002) suggest that the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates 
constituted a shift in the monetary regime.  This shift ushered in a period of alternating 
expansionary and contractionary (or go-stop) monetary policy which the authors argue was a 
causal factor in the U.S. stagflation of the 1970s and early 1980s.
14  Using a stylized model in 
which agents are slow to “wake up to” a regime change, Barsky and Kilian (2002) show that a 
go-stop sequence of shocks can generate stagflation similar to the U.S. experience. 
In a second paper, Orphanides and Williams (2005a) model a situation in which agents 
form inflation expectations via a perpetual learning mechanism: finite memory least squares.  
Such an approach is particularly useful in the midst of structural shifts (Evans 2005), though 
such shifts that would require the use of or benefit from perpetual learning are not modeled by 
the authors.  Instead, Orphanides and Williams (2005a) subject their model to a particular 
sequence of inflationary shocks—potentially resulting from either the demand or supply side of 
the economy, but intended to resemble events buffeting the U.S. economy during the 1970s—
and show that stagflation can result in such an environment if the monetary authority is too 
dovish on inflation.
15 
Both papers show that stagflation can result from particular sets of one-time shocks in the 
spirit of an impulse response—and that supply shocks are not necessary to explain the 
phenomenon—when agents must effectively learn about aspects of the economy.  In this paper, I 
make regime changes a stochastic component of the economy and show that stagflation can 
                                                 
12 In the table, all simulations when β=0.05 contain regime changes.  Running a counterfactual experiment in which 
β is still set to 0.05 but the regime changes are suppressed—i.e., ζt is forced to zero for all t—produces stagflation in 
87% of the simulations, a slightly higher incidence than when the regime is allowed to (and does) change. 
13 For other papers on the connection between money and stagflation, see also Loyo (1999), Christiano and Gust 
(2000), Nelson and Nikolov (2004), and Orphanides and Williams (2005b).  Brunner et al. (1980) and Cukierman 
(1984, chapter 9) examine the connection between permanent and transitory shock confusion and stagflation in the 
context of a productivity shock. 
14 To a lesser extent, Blinder (1979) and Bruno and Sachs (1985) identify go-stop monetary policy as one of the 
many shocks buffeting the U.S. economy during the 1970s.  Helliwell (1988) acknowledges that go-stop monetary 
policy could cause stagflation in general. 
15 Whether the Federal Reserve was hawkish or dovish during the 1970s is open to debate; see Clarida et al. (2000) 
and Orphanides (2000). 18 
occur regularly in a dynamic setting.  The results that I present do not require taking a position 
on whether the monetary authority is dovish or hawkish with respect to inflation.  Additionally, I 
find that a monetary regime change itself need not occur to generate stagflation. 
Explaining why stagflation consistently occurs in the model is aided by Table 1 and the 
impulse responses (Figure 5 through Figure 7).  Table 1 indicates that increases in the probability 
that a monetary regime change β will occur in a given quarter lead to more stagflation.  The 
larger is β, the more volatile are the inflation rate and the output gap within the sample period.  
Naturally, part of the increasing volatility of inflation can be explained by the fact that money 
growth, and thereby inflation, becomes more volatile when the regime changes.  The other part, 
however, is a consequence of the firm’s learning problem. 
Immediately following a shock to money growth, price-setters who update their 
information cannot be sure whether it is a transitory change or a regime shift.  As a result, they 
effectively “hedge their bets” and place some positive probability on each event when setting 
their prices.  It is only with the passing of time—when agents have more time-series data on 
money growth and more agents have updated their information—that most price-setters are able 
to determine which event occurred.  Consequently, the inflation rate in the immediate aftermath 
of a shock falls between what it would be if the shock were known to be transitory and if it were 
known to be a regime shift.  The greater is β, the greater is the probability that a regime change 
with long-lasting effects on money growth occurred, and the more closely the inflation response 
will resemble that experienced following a known regime change. 
If it turns out that the shock was only transitory, however, inflation will overshoot where 
it “should be” given the true money growth shock.  Over time, price-setters will learn this; 
however, inflation’s overshooting combined with its inertia increase the volatility of the output 
gap.  The greater is β, the greater is inflation’s overshooting, and the greater the volatility of the 
output gap.  The volatility of the output gap when the regime can change, coupled with the 
inflation inertia imparted by the model, lead to conditions conducive to the emergence of 
monetary stagflation, even in the absence of an actual regime change.
16 
 
                                                 
16 See Figure 6, where a single unknown transitory shock causes inflation to be persistently high while the output 
gap turns negative and is falling in quarters 11–13. 19 
The Role of Central Bank Transparency and Stability 
 
To examine the role that the central bank’s lack of transparency plays, I alter the model in 
Section III to consider the case in which the monetary authority is completely transparent: price-
setters are not only able to observe the overall growth of the money supply, but they are also able 
to observe its individual components—the monetary regime Mt and transitory shocks εt.  This 
might be the case if the central bank’s policy decisions were implemented and completely 
described to (and believed by) price-setters concurrently.  Because shocks and regime changes 
are both stochastic, however, there are no announcements of future events.  With this 
transparency, the models are re-simulated using the same shocks as were previously used and the 
incidence of stagflation is reported in the “Transparent Central Bank” columns of Table 3. 
Making the monetary policies transparent reduces the likelihood that stagflation will 
occur for all β>0.  (When β=0, the central bank’s policies are transparent and stable, in that long-
lasting changes in the money growth rate—i.e., monetary regime changes—do not occur.)  When 
firms perfectly observe monetary policy, the simulated economies suffer from stagflation fifteen 
to twenty percentage-points less often than the case in which price-setters have to learn about 
changes to money growth.  The greater accuracy in interpreting the money growth rate allows 
firms that update their information to set more accurate prices, thereby reducing the variance of 
the inflation rate and, by extension, the variance of the output gap.  This also eliminates the 
overshooting phenomena elucidated above. 
Now, most stagflation coincides with the presence of regime changes.  A sudden 
contractionary regime change leads to a sharp recession and a slightly more gradual fall in the 
inflation rate (the mirror image of Figure 8).  Had the economy previously been in a situation of 
relatively high inflation (due to, say, an earlier series of positive transitory money growth 
shocks) with output near the natural rate, such a shock—even when fully perceived—can cause 
stagflation.  These findings support the idea that central bank transparency can help to reduce the 
incidence of poor macroeconomic performance as embodied by monetary stagflation.  
Furthermore, monetary authorities who eschew long-lasting regime changes in favor of more 
stable policies greatly reduce the probability of stagflation arising from monetary factors. 
 20 
The Role of Inflation Inertia 
 
As calibrated above, the sticky information model induces substantial inertia into the 
inflation process.  With α=0.1, the maximal inflation response occurs seven quarters after a 
known transitory shock.  Keen (2005) and Coibion (2006) note, however, that this inflation 
inertia is directly related to the amount of real rigidity within the model: the greater the real 
rigidity (the smaller is the parameter α), the greater is the inflation inertia.  By varying α, I 
consider how variations in inflation inertia affect the incidence of stagflation. 
Figure 9(a) shows that greater amounts of inflation inertia (as measured by the length of 
time it takes for the inflation rate to reach its maximal response following a known transitory 
shock) are correlated with more stagflation.  For the range of inflation inertia suggested by 
empirical studies (e.g., Nelson 1998 and Estrella and Fuhrer 2002), stagflation occurs at least 
once in more than 80% of simulations.  Sticky information models with little inflation inertia 
cannot regularly generate stagflation in the presence of regime changes.  This is true whether 
price-setters need learn about the regime changes or not.  Intuitively, inflation’s rapid response to 
a money shock reduces output gap movements and prevents the combination of overshooting and 
inflation inertia that produces the oscillatory behavior seen in Figure 6.  This causes inflation and 
the output gap to co-move positively, in contrast to the negative co-movement characterizing 
stagflation.  Thus sufficient inflation inertia is a key ingredient in generating stagflation.
17 
 
Stagflation in a Sticky Price Model 
 
To assess what role—if any—sticky information plays in generating stagflation, I 
consider what would occur if the monetary authority were unchanged but inflation were instead 
determined by a hybrid New Keynesian Phillips curve  
  11 (1 ) tt t t t yE π θπ π − + =+ − Ω+ Ω . (4.1) 
(The Mathematical Appendix provides details of the underlying model.)  For comparison with 
the sticky information model, the sticky price model is calibrated to generate an identical amount 
                                                 
17 Varying the other parameter values (λ, ρ, 
2
γ σ , and 
2
ε σ ) produces an incidence of stagflation similar to that 
presented in the paper.  Parameter combinations which fail to generate much stagflation tend to require frequent 
information updating (e.g., λ=0.5, which also implies little inflation inertia) and small signal-to-noise ratios (e.g., 
22 /0 . 1 γε σσ ≈ ). 21 
of inflation inertia.  Table 4 presents analogous results to Table 3, and Figure 9(b) varies the 
amount of forward-looking behavior in (4.1) to generate the analog of Figure 9(a). 
In general, the table and figure show that stagflation is not an artifact of the sticky 
information model.  When regime changes occur on average once every ten years and price-
setters cannot immediately distinguish between transitory shocks and regime changes, stagflation 
occurs in 69% of simulations, compared with 76% of sticky information simulations.  Also 
similar to the sticky information model, the greater is the degree of inflation inertia, the higher is 
the probability that stagflation will occur within a given simulation. 
The only notable difference between the two specifications comes when the central bank 
is transparent and there is little or no inflation inertia.  In the sticky price model, this occurs when 
the Phillips curve takes on the standard form  1 tt t t yE π θπ + = + .  The fact that central bank 
transparency leads to a higher incidence of stagflation is the exact opposite of the 
“disinflationary booms” criticism leveled against this model: these are “expansionary 
stagflations.”  Following a known expansionary regime change, money growth initially increases 
but then increases still more in the near term because of (3.4).  In the sticky price model with 
transparency, agents anticipate the secondary increase and set their prices too high immediately 
following the expansionary regime change (since it may be some time before they can adjust 
again).  This causes inflation to exceed money growth temporarily, implying that output must 
fall.  Had the simulated economy been near the natural rate of output, this burst of inflation 




This paper finds that a dynamic, stochastic model with purely monetary shocks can consistently 
generate stagflation.  The form of stagflation in the simulated data matches key characteristics of 
the U.S. experience during the 1970s and early 1980s, based upon a close inspection of the 
historical record.   
The mechanism driving this result is the ability of the monetary authority to induce both 
transitory and long-lasting changes to its operating target, where the latter can be termed “regime 
changes.”  I show how the inflation and output dynamics of a sticky information model are 
affected when price-setters cannot distinguish between these shocks.  Even when regime changes 22 
are a rare occurrence, stagflation occurs regularly in model simulations.  If the monetary regime 
changes on average once every ten years, stagflation occurs in 76% of model simulations.  The 
intuition for this result is simple: the learning process required when transitory shocks and 
regime changes are indistinguishable induces volatility into the output gap which, when 
combined with inertial inflation, produces conditions conducive to the appearance of stagflation. 
To isolate the factors at play in the simulations, I consider several exercises.  In the first, I 
show that regime changes per se are not requisite to generate stagflation.  The uncertainty 
associated with the learning mechanism is enough to produce stagflation even in the absence of 
actual regime changes.  In a second exercise, I demonstrate that a more transparent central bank 
that allows price-setters to distinguish between transitory shocks and regime changes would 
reduce the incidence of poor macroeconomic performance as embodied by monetary stagflation.  
Nevertheless, some stagflation continues to occur, in particular related to monetary regime 
changes.  In a third exercise, I show that inflation inertia plays an important role in generating 
stagflation.  Finally, I show that the results are not an artifact of the sticky information model: a 
hybrid New Keynesian Phillips curve with a suitable amount of inflation inertia can consistently 
generate stagflation as well. 
Despite these exercises, this paper leaves open several questions.  The first regards the 
stagflation associated with regime changes that occurs when the central bank’s actions are 
transparent.  In this paper, regime changes are stochastic events that are unknown to price-setters 
and the central bank beforehand.  However, if the central bank were to announce regime changes 
prior to implementing them, it is possible that the incidence of monetary stagflation could be 
reduced even further.
18  Another question concerns the stagflation algorithm proposed for this 
paper.  While this algorithm was based upon a close investigation of the U.S. historical record, 
would it also be useful for identifying stagflationary episodes in other countries?  I leave 
exploration of these possibilities for future research. 
 
                                                 
18 Cf. Mankiw and Reis (2002), where the output loss following an announced disinflation—similar in spirit to a 
contractionary regime change in this paper—is trivial compared with the case in which the change is unanticipated. 23 
VI Mathematical  Appendix 
 
This section derives the inflationary process for the sticky information model given by equation 
(3.8).  I also show how the signal extraction problem factors into the analysis. 
Mankiw and Reis (2002) show that the sticky information Phillips curve is 
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where  t y Δ  is output growth.  Aggregate demand takes a quantity theoretic form 
  tt t mpy = + . (6.2) 
Substituting for yt and Δyt in (6.1) yields 
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The money supply rule is given by 
  11 , tt tt t M tt mM m M M ρ ερ ξ −− Δ= + Δ + = +. (6.4) 
This implies money supply can be written in two MA(∞) forms, each of which is a function of 
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To find the δi coefficients, substitute for Δmt, mt, πt, and pt in (6.3). 
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When i+1≤j,  1 t itj tj E xx −− − − = ; thus we need only deal with expectations when i+1>j.   
Since  tj x −  is composed of  tj ε − , which is white noise, and  tj M − , this equates to 
forecasting  tj M −  with information known as of time  1 ti − − .  I assume that this forecast is made 24 
using the Kalman filter; see Hamilton (1994).  Rewriting (6.4) in terms of its state-space 
representation, the one-period-ahead forecast of Mt—i.e.,  1| 1 ˆ
tt t t Ex M − − = —is 
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Since ξt=ζt*γt is the product of two independent random variables—ζ is Poisson with mean and 
variance β and γ is normal with mean zero and variance 
2
γ σ —then 
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(6.9) only depends upon model parameters and its own history, I set 
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Matching coefficients on both sides for  ti x − , i=0,1,2,…, yields the set of  i δ s needed from (6.6). 
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The above solution covers the case in which price-setters are unable to distinguish 
between transitory and permanent shocks to money growth.  Suppose, however, that the 
monetary authority is transparent and its actions can be perfectly observed; i.e., firms can 
observe the components of Δmt—Mt and εt—and their entire histories.  Money growth and the 





tt i t i t t i j t i j
ij i
mM m M ρε ρ ε
∞∞ ∞
−− − − − −
== =
Δ= + = + ∑∑ ∑ . 
This changes the conjectured inflation and price processes in the sticky information model to 
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Substituting these conjectures into (6.3), and assuming that expectations are formed rationally 
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The hybrid New Keynesian Phillips curve is a modification of Galí and Gertler (1999).  A 
fraction λ of firms have the opportunity to change their prices each period, and of those updating 
firms a fraction ω are forward-looking and set price 
F
t p .  The remaining firms set their prices by 
the rule-of-thumb  11
B
tt t ppπ −− =+ , where  11 1 (1 )
FB
tt t p pp ωω − −− =+ −.  For comparison with the 
sticky information model, I ignore discounting and assume that the static optimal price at time t 
is given by (3.1) (which naturally may differ from the optimal reset price of a forward-looking 
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Obtaining the same amount of inflation inertia in this sticky price model as in the sticky 
information model, in response to a known transitory shock, requires calibrating ω=0.3. 
The model is solved similar to the method above and in Mankiw and Reis (2002).  












where F is the forward operator, L is the lag operator, and η1>1 and η2,η3<1 are the roots of the 
polynomial.  This implies that 26 
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When firms cannot distinguish between transitory and permanent shocks, conjecture 
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Using (6.13) and (6.5), rewrite (6.12) as  
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For (i+j)≥ℓ,  tt ij t ij Ex x +−− +−− = ll  in the last term.  When (i+j)< ℓ, expectations are formed as above.  
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When the shocks are distinguishable, conjecture that inflation and the price level are  
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Figure 1: Annual Data on U.S. Real GDP Growth and Inflation, 1970–83 























Notes: Annual growth rates are natural log differences of fourth quarter data. Real GDP is in 
billions of chained 1996 dollars. GDP deflator is chain-type price index with base year 1996. Both 
series are seasonally adjusted. 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Figure 2: Monthly U.S. Unemployment Rate, 1970–83 









Notes: Civilian unemployment rate, seasonally adjusted. 31 
 
Figure 3: Quarterly Data on the U.S. Output Gap and Inflation, 1970–83 

















Notes: Inflation is annualized. The output gap is created via the HP filter. Real GDP is in billions 
of chained 1996 dollars. GDP deflator is chain-type price index with base year 1996. Both series 
are seasonally adjusted. 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Figure 4: The U.S. Experience, 1959–2002 




















Notes: Stagflation is defined using the algorithm in the text. Inflation is not annualized. The output 
gap is created via the HP filter. Real GDP is in billions of chained 1996 dollars. GDP deflator is 
chain-type price index with base year 1996. Both series are seasonally adjusted. 32 
Figure 5: Impulse Responses to a Transitory Shock to Money Growth, No Regime Changes 
Possible (β = 0) 















Notes: Response to a positive one standard deviation transitory shock to money growth.  Inflation 
is annualized.  Since β=0, firms know that the shock is transitory. 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Figure 6: Impulse Responses to a Transitory Shock to Money Growth, Regime Changes 
Possible (β > 0) 















Notes: Response to a positive one standard deviation transitory shock to money growth.  Inflation 
is annualized.  Since β>0, firms must learn about the nature of the shock. 33 
Figure 7: Impulse Responses to a Monetary Regime Change under Learning 












Notes: Response to a positive one standard deviation monetary regime change.  Inflation is 
annualized.  Firms must learn about the nature of the shock. 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Figure 8: Impulse Responses to a Monetary Regime Change, Transparent Central Bank 













Notes: Response to a positive one standard deviation monetary regime change.  Inflation is 
annualized. Firms know that the shock is a regime change. 34 
 
Figure 9: Inflation Inertia and the Incidence of Stagflation 
Figure 9(a): Sticky Information Model 





































Figure 9(b): Sticky Price Model 






































Notes: Inflation inertia is the number of quarters it takes for the inflation rate to peak in response 
to a known transitory shock to money growth. The real rigidity parameter (α) is varied in the 
sticky information model. The fraction of forward-looking firms (ω) is varied in the sticky price 





Table 1: Simulation Results and Stagflation 
      Standard deviation of: 
β 
Implied average 





(% of simulations) 
Average number 
of stagflationary 
quarters    Money growth  Inflation  Output gap 
                
0 –    5.8%  0.2    0.70%  0.31%  2.48% 
0.005 50    42.1%  1.4    0.74%  0.43%  2.83% 
0.01 25    60.5%  2.3    0.78%  0.52%  3.00% 
0.025 10    75.9%  3.6    0.88%  0.70%  3.31% 
0.05 5    84.4%  4.5    1.04%  0.93%  3.72% 
0.1 2.5    86.5%  5.1    1.31%  1.29%  4.34% 
0.25 1    90.0%  6.1    2.01%  2.10%  5.70% 
                
     U.S. data:  5.0   0.88% 0.62%  1.55% 
Notes: When β=0, no regime changes are possible and all firms know this. When β>0, firms use a signal-extraction problem 
to learn the nature of the monetary regime. Implied average regime duration is 1/β (converted into years). Incidence of 
stagflation is the percentage of simulations in which there is at least one stagflationary episode, as defined in Section II. 
Standard deviations for the simulated models are averages across the 1,000 simulations for the within-sample 176 quarter 






Table 2: Separating Simulations into One Monetary Regime and Multiple Monetary Regimes 
     One Regime    Multiple Regimes 
β 
Implied average 
regime duration  
(in years) 
 Incidence  of 
stagflation  










              
0 –    5.8%  0.2    –  – 
0.005 50    39.1%  1.0    44.3%  1.8 
0.01 25    55.6%  1.5    61.2%  2.5 
0.025 10    77.0%  2.5    75.9%  3.6 
0.05 5    –  –    84.4%  4.5 
Notes: When β=0, no regime changes are possible and all firms know this. When β>0, firms must use a signal-extraction 
problem to learn the nature of the monetary regime. Implied average regime duration is 1/β (converted into years). 
Simulations are separated ex post into the “One Regime” or “Multiple Regimes” groups depending upon whether the 
monetary regime changed during the simulation or not. Incidence of stagflation is the percentage of simulations in which 





Table 3: Central Bank Transparency and the Incidence of Stagflation 
     Learning Required    Transparent Central Bank 
β 
Implied average regime 













                
0  –   –  –  –   5.8% 5.8%  – 
0.005 50    42.1%  39.1%  44.3%    20.3%  5.8%  31.6% 
0.01 25    60.5%  55.6%  61.2%    33.3%  5.8%  39.3% 
0.025 10    75.9%  77.0%  75.9%    54.9%  5.8%  55.8% 
0.05 5    84.4%  87.1%  84.4%    67.8%  5.8%  67.8% 
Notes: Implied average regime duration is 1/β (converted into years). When β=0, no regime changes are possible and all 
firms know this. “Learning Required” implies that firms use a signal-extraction problem to learn the nature of the monetary 
regime when β>0. “Transparent Central Bank” implies that firms are able to see individual components of money growth 
with complete accuracy. Simulations are separated ex post into the “One Regime” or “Multiple Regimes” groups depending 
on whether the monetary regime changed during the simulation or not. Incidence of stagflation is the percentage of 
simulations in which there is at least one stagflationary episode, as defined in Section II. The same money growth process is 





Table 4: The Incidence of Stagflation with a Hybrid New Keynesian Phillips Curve 
     Learning Required    Transparent Central Bank 
β 
Implied average regime 













                  
0 –    –  –  –    10.5%  10.5%  – 
0.005 50    43.9%  39.5%  47.2%    25.6%  10.5%  34.9% 
0.01 25    57.1%  49.3%  58.0%    36.0%  10.5%  41.4% 
0.025 10    68.5%  58.4%  68.6%    56.9%  10.5%  57.7% 
0.05 5    77.0%  62.7%  77.0%    67.3%  10.5%  67.3% 
Notes: Implied average regime duration is 1/β (converted into years). When β=0, no regime changes are possible and all 
firms know this. “Learning Required” implies that firms use a signal-extraction problem to learn the nature of the monetary 
regime when β>0. “Transparent Central Bank” implies that firms are able to see individual components of money growth 
with complete accuracy. Simulations are separated ex post into the “One Regime” or “Multiple Regimes” groups depending 
on whether the monetary regime changed during the simulation or not. Incidence of stagflation is the percentage of 
simulations in which there is at least one stagflationary episode, as defined in Section II. The same money growth process is 
used for the “learning required” and “transparent central bank” cases, as well as for both the sticky price model (presented 
here) and the sticky information model (Table 3). See the text for details. 
 